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Abstract 
Throughout the organic world cooperation provides mutual benefit but is vulnerable to 
exploitation from free riders. Over the last thirty years work in evolutionary biology and 
game theory has provided understanding of the conditions necessary for the maintenance of 
cooperation, and advances in gene-culture coevolution theory have extended this 
understanding to our own species. After a preamble on the evolutionary analysis of behaviour 
I outline this work. I then consider how cooperation is influenced by environmental adversity 
and find that in non-human species it is enhanced under these circumstances in a range of 
taxa. In a sample of human cases the same result is found in a majority, but the opposite 
effect in some when socioeconomic position is the measure of quality. In anthropological 
studies of societies living in extremis, again the opposite effect is found. I propose a sigmoid 
shape for the relationship between adversity and fitness (or human well-being) and a 
consequent inverted-U shaped relationship between adversity and the benefit of cooperation. 
Most of the data presented on the relationship between adversity and cooperation are 
consistent with this proposal. I suggest further tests of the proposal and place the study of 
cooperation in the broader context of prosociality. 
 
Keywords: adversity; austerity; cooperation; disadvantage; harshness; precarity; prosociality; 
risk 
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1. Introduction 
Cooperation offers benefits through the sharing of physical power, resources, skills, 
knowledge, problem-solving experience, social support and social influence. But cooperation 
is a fragile condition, vulnerable to exploitation from those who take without contributing. 
Many disciplines have important contributions to make to its study (Lazarus 2003) and here I 
apply an evolutionary approach (and for humans a gene-culture coevolutionary approach; see 
section 3) to understand what happens to cooperation – throughout the organic world but 
focusing on our own species – in conditions of adversity. Does it flourish or wither, and why?  
 
Cooperation, as understood in biology and economics, is defined in terms of its consequences 
for those involved in a social interaction and this is the approach I take here. To be precise an 
act is cooperative if it results in a benefit to both the actor and the recipient(s) of the act. My 
metric for evaluating benefit in non-human species is, in principle, Darwinian fitness, 
although empirically we often have to make do with a proxy for fitness. By Darwinian fitness 
I mean lifetime reproductive success, the total number of offspring produced. In the human 
case, where a gene-culture coevolutionary approach is more appropriate, we need to be more 
cautious in assuming that choices are always adaptive in a Darwinian sense, and I explain this 
more fully in section 2.  
 
Defining adversity  
An environment is defined as adverse if it has some negative impact on the species 
concerned. For an evolutionary analysis, and for non-human species, the metric for this 
impact is fitness. For our own species it is also often the case that fitness is lower in what we 
deem to be a more adverse environment. However, as I have already said, we cannot assume 
that all human behaviour is adaptive and it is more parsimonious to claim simply that what I 
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will call ‘well-being’ is reduced in a more adverse environment, my term being simply a 
more concise equivalent of ‘subjective well-being’ which combines measures of cognition 
(satisfaction) and positive affect (Cummins 2000) . I discuss the relationship between well-
being and fitness further in section 2. 
 
Broadly, adversities have abiotic or biotic origins. In the first category are variables such as 
temperature, aridity and altitude for which a species will have some optimal value at which 
its fitness (or well-being) is greatest, larger departures from this value bringing greater 
adversity. Biotic adversity arises from predators, parasites, disease and competitors. Uniquely 
human adversities, both abiotic and biotic, include pollution, housing, employment, health 
services, education, poverty, lack of opportunity and the social environment: other people 
who individually, collectively or institutionally may harm another physically, emotionally, 
economically or in any other way, either actively or by withholding some good. Adversity 
may also be felt in terms of relative deprivation (Davis 1959; Wilkinson and Pickett [2009] 
2010).  
 
Adversity (or harshness as it is also termed) clearly does impact on human well-being and 
consequently has profound and widespread influences on cognition, behavior and 
development beyond its impact on cooperation (Low 1990; Ellis et al. 2009; Frankenhuis, 
Panchanathan, and Nettle 2016). These influences arise from sources that range from the 
abiotic environment through the personal to the societal. For example, lower socioeconomic 
status is associated with a ‘behavioural constellation of deprivation’ that leads to a focus on 
present-oriented behaviours (Pepper and Nettle 2017). Further, some aspects of adversity, 
such as extrinsic mortality risks (Nettle 2010; Frankenhuis, Panchanathan, and Nettle 2016; 
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Pepper and Nettle 2017), and economic and political factors (Standing 2011), are outside the 
individual’s control. 
 
Outline 
Following a preamble on evolutionary explanation (section 2) I describe current thinking on 
the evolutionary origin of cooperation in the human species (section 3). Then, following an 
account of how cooperation is influenced by adversity (section 4) in organisms generally, but 
focusing on the human species, I offer a contribution to the explanation of these relationships 
(section 5). Finally, I extend the discussion briefly to other forms of prosociality (section 6) 
and draw conclusions (section 7).  
 
2. A preamble on the evolutionary analysis of behaviour 
Given their very different intellectual histories social and evolutionary scientists have largely 
worked independently to understand human behaviour and social structures, and when they 
have interacted it has been more often in conflict than in productive dialogue. Matters have 
improved as evolutionary biologists have come to appreciate that any evolved behavioural 
predisposition must emerge as action through the processes of individual development 
occurring within a particular cultural environment. And having learned these general lessons 
from psychology, anthropology and sociology they have gone on to formalise the ways in 
which organic and cultural evolution interact, as discussed below. But since the 
rapprochement is not yet complete it will be useful, I think, to outline the nature of the 
questions the evolutionary scientist asks about behaviour and the conceptual approach that is 
brought to bear in searching for answers, before proposing some ideas for understanding 
cooperation under adversity that have an evolutionary-cultural foundation. 
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The social scientist seeking a causal understanding of human action is concerned with what 
the biologist calls proximate causation. That is, finding the influences within the environment 
(including the social and cultural environment), and within the individual, that account for the 
behaviour of interest; influences that the psychologist calls motivational. And, by extension, 
an understanding is sought for how behaviour varies between individuals and cultures. The 
evolutionary behavioural analyst asks, in the first place, a different question, one that the 
biologist calls ultimate causation: what were the evolutionary forces (generally forces of 
natural selection) that have resulted in behaviour appearing in the particular form that it does, 
in response to particular proximate influences? And the guiding principle in generating 
hypotheses about ultimate causation is that it is predicted – under the influence of natural 
selection – to produce adaptive behavior: behaviour that efficiently solves a problem in the 
organism’s life. 
 
But there is a second stage of evolutionary analysis; hypotheses of ultimate causation lead 
naturally to complementary hypotheses about the environmental cues – the proximate causes 
– predicted to influence the emergence of behaviour patterns given their proposed adaptive 
function (Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby 1992). This is clearly a different source for ideas 
about proximate causation to those from the social sciences, but one that has a strong 
foundation in the theory of natural selection. 
 
The generation of hypotheses of proximate causation from natural selection theory has been a 
particular feature of evolutionary psychology (Tooby and Cosmides 1990) and the 
evolutionary logic underlying this approach is important for the ideas I present in section 5 
concerning the influence of adversity on cooperation. Using this relationship as an exemplar 
the argument from evolutionary psychology is that natural selection over our evolutionary 
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history has been responsible for the learned psychological predispositions that we bring to 
cooperative decision making in the contemporary world, as well as the proximate causes that 
turn these predispositions into actions. I would argue that this is a particularly strong premise 
for our present case since cooperative decisions, environmental adversity, and the interaction 
between the two, must have had a great impact on fitness throughout human history. These 
predispositions govern contemporary behaviour to the extent that ‘present conditions 
resemble past conditions in specific ways made developmentally and functionally important 
by the design of those adaptations’ (Tooby and Cosmides 1990, 375). The approach is 
perfectly compatible with the evidence that cooperative tendencies vary with the economic 
and societal structures of different cultures, variation which can sometimes also be 
understood in adaptive terms (Henrich et al. 2004) as a result of further learned 
predispositions. Whether any of these predispositions are optimal in terms of fitness 
enhancement in the changed environments of the modern world remains an open question, is 
not assumed by the evolutionary psychology approach, and is not assumed here. And since 
the consequences of cooperative decisions for people are my primary focus I will, 
parsimoniously, refer to ‘well-being’ (rather than fitness) to describe the relative positive 
outcomes of cooperating or not cooperating in environments of differing qualities. In the non-
human examples the outcome measures are either fitness or, more frequently, proxies for 
fitness. 
 
An example of how the evolutionary psychology approach seeks to understand evolved 
proximate causes will be useful here. Lieberman, Tooby, and Cosmides (2003) tested 
Westermarck’s (1921) theory for the proximate causation of incest avoidance, an adaptive 
phenomenon in that it reduces the damaging effects of inbreeding depression. Westermarck 
proposed that incest avoidance, and the moral objection to incest, were achieved by the co-
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residence of siblings from an early age resulting in ‘sexual negative imprinting’. Lieberman 
and coworkers found support for their hypothesis, derived directly from Westermarck’s 
proposal, that duration of co-residence with an opposite-sex sibling would correlate positively 
with the strength of the moral opposition to sibling incest. The association was independent 
of degree of relatedness (adopted, step-, half- or full-sib) while relatedness itself, the 
functionally important factor, did not influence the moral attitude to incest. This is 
understandable in evolutionary terms since a child cannot reliably know its kin relationship to 
another child it grows up with. Duration of co-residence, however, is a reliable cue since 
experienced directly, and crucially it correlated significantly with relatedness, the 
functionally relevant variable. These results illustrate the point that evolved proximate causal 
factors need not themselves represent the adaptive variable but must map reliably onto it. 
 
Evolutionary biologists and social scientists continue to generate their hypotheses concerning 
proximate causes from different principles. This is a difficult division to bridge, but on 
another area of dispute further mutual understanding should be possible. This is the role of 
genetics in the causation  of behaviour and, in particular, the worry by some social scientists 
that an evolutionary analysis of behaviour assumes genetic determinism, the notion that a 
particular genetic make-up fully determines a behaviour; given gene X behaviour Y will be 
shown, and will be shown whatever the environment throws at it. While some biologists may 
have held this view in the past it is now a straw man. The notion of innateness is discredited; 
rather behaviour is understood to unfold during life as a continuing interaction between the 
individual, its genotype and the environment (Mameli and Bateson 2006, Bateson and 
Mameli 2007), including the cultural environment (Nettle 2009).  
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It is the complex interplay between the individual, its genotype and the environment just 
described that is subject to natural selection, behaviour responding flexibly and often 
adaptively to the environment through processes involving direct experience, social influence 
and the internalization of norms. Although this means that behaviour is subject to various 
biases, and that we are not blank slates (Pinker 2002) it does not necessitate genetic 
determinism, just as an enlightened view of the power of the environment to influence 
behaviour does not merit it with an analogous determinism.  
 
Further, there is no longer a fundamental conflict between the study of culture and of 
biological evolution as forces for change. In the discipline known as ‘gene-culture 
coevolution’ the two are now integrated (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Richerson and Boyd 
2005). The logic of the approach is that cultural practices modify the human environment and 
consequently influence the selection pressures acting on the human genome and directly on 
the cultural practices themselves, producing feedback loops, both positive and negative. 
Cultural transmission may be horizontal, vertical or oblique and natural selection is assumed 
to act on both genetic and cultural variation in behaviour and cognition, although cultural 
success may look very different to genetic success. Culture evolves and the methods of 
evolutionary biology can be used to study its evolution. And gene-culture coevolution theory 
now has a new importance following recent findings that cultural practices modifying the 
environment have resulted in changes in gene frequencies (Laland, Odling-Smee, and Myles 
2010; Richerson, Boyd, and Henrich 2010). It is therefore no longer possible to dismiss the 
idea that cultural forces might have changed the human genome by claiming that there has 
not been sufficient time for natural selection to act. And indeed natural selection continues to 
act on the human genome (e.g. Byars et al. 2010). 
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3. How did cooperation evolve in our species? 
Understanding the evolutionary origin of cooperation has been a challenge since helping 
others would not at first sight appear to be favoured by natural selection. The method 
required to analyse this problem is game theory, developed by mathematicians and 
economists to predict rational choices when two or more individuals interact and the choices 
they make influence the payoff for other players. Economic rationality is classically deemed 
to be self-regarding in that it maximises some kind of personal payoff (Gintis 2003). 
However, achieving maximum payoff may not be possible when the consequence of one’s 
choices is under the influence of the choices made by others, as in a social interaction. Instead 
of reaching the ‘best’ choice, defined by maximum payoff, therefore, rational players in a 
game come to settle on the set of choices which means that no player can do better by 
choosing to play differently, such a set of plays being termed a Nash equilibrium (Binmore 
2007a, b; Colman 1999).  
 
Evolutionary biologists took this economic equilibrium concept in games and applied it to a 
similar problem, in which natural selection determines the decisions made by the rational 
player. If at the Nash equilibrium no player can make a more profitable move this is just the 
outcome to be expected when individual decisions are evolving under the force of natural 
selection, with fitness as the payoff metric. And, following this logic, the evolutionary 
equivalent of a Nash equilibrium is termed an evolutionarily stable strategy, or ESS 
(Maynard Smith 1982). Both the Nash equilibrium and the ESS are stable equilibrium states 
and thus, by definition, are what we expect to see in nature. An important difference between 
the two concepts, however, is that while the Nash equilibrium must take rational play as an 
assumption, a state of affairs on which players cannot improve is built into the theory of 
natural selection and therefore also the ESS concept.   
	   11	  
 
The game theory approach to understanding the conditions for the existence of cooperation 
can be exemplified by the well-known economic game, the prisoners’ dilemma (e.g. Colman 
1999). In this game two individuals interact in a scenario in which each actor has a choice of 
two plays or strategies which, in general terms, can be thought of as cooperating with (C) or 
defecting on (D) the other player. The original prisoner scenario is unnecessarily complicated 
and I will illustrate the dilemma with a simpler scenario described by Colman (1999). A 
Buyer has decided to purchase a diamond from a Seller and a price has been agreed. For 
some reason the exchange must be made in secret and so the two agree each to leave a bag, 
the Buyer’s containing the agreed price and the Seller’s the diamond, at a different place in a 
wood, after which each will retrieve the other’s bag. The problem is, of course, that either 
party might be tempted to leave an empty bag, thus defecting (D) on the other, rather than 
cooperating (C) with a full bag. Figure 1 shows the relative payoffs to Buyer and Seller of the 
four possible outcomes of the exchange. The absolute value of the numbers in the figure are 
arbitrary; all that matters, and what defines the dilemma, is their ranking, a higher number 
indicating a more preferred outcome. 
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Buyer 
 
Cooperate 
(Bag full) 
 
Defect 
(Bag empty) 
 
 
Seller 
Cooperate 
(Bag full) 
 
 
3, 3 
 
0, 5 
Defect 
(Bag empty) 
 
 
5, 0 
 
2, 2 
 
Figure 1. Payoff matrix for the prisoners’ dilemma. The first payoff in each cell is to 
the Seller. 
 
If both parties cooperate and fulfil their agreement (a CC outcome) they gain 3 points but if 
both come with an empty bag (DD) they gain only 2 since they have both failed to close a 
deal they desired. If one party leaves an empty bag (D) and the other a full one (C) then the 
defector goes home with both the cash and the diamond (5 points), while the other party, the 
sucker, has neither (0 points).  
 
What is the equilibrium outcome to this game, represented by the best response of each 
player to the play of the other? The answer, which can be seen in Figure 1, is for both players 
to defect (DD) since whatever the other player does it is always more profitable to defect 
than to cooperate. The dilemma demonstrated by the game is that this outcome, though a 
result of rational play, is not the best outcome that can be achieved. Both parties would 
clearly prefer a CC outcome to a DD outcome but even if there was some way for them to 
agree on such an outcome it would still pay to renege on the agreement. 
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This game captures the essence of the problem of how to maintain cooperation and the logic 
can be simply extended to interactions between more than two players. Why should a hunter 
exert himself fully in the hunt, and why should he share his catch with others in his hunter-
gatherer group? Why pull your weight in a team effort or, as a nation, fulfil promises on 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions? The temptation to defect is often rational in economic 
(selfish) terms. 
 
It would therefore seem that an ultimate explanation of the fact that cooperation is a feature 
of human social life cannot rest on the logic of the prisoners’ dilemma as I have described it, 
in which the two parties meet only once. In the real world we often enter into relationships in 
which we interact repeatedly over days, months or years, and an ultimate explanation must 
take into account the fact that for most of our evolutionary history we lived in small groups in 
which all identities were mutually known and people interacted repeatedly throughout their 
lives (Kelly 2013). In the language of game theory we played iterated (i.e. repeated), not one-
shot, games with each other and thus had the opportunity to reward past support, punish past 
defections or break off a relationship altogether. This complicates enormously the strategies 
that can be played, compared to the one-shot game I have described, strategies that take into 
account the history of the relationship. In particular, the fear of retaliation in later encounters 
encourages cooperation and can be the basis for a cooperative ESS in the repeated prisoners’ 
dilemma, such as the Tit-for-Tat strategy: start by cooperating, then copy partner’s last play 
(Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; see also Nowak and Sigmund 1993 for another cooperative 
ESS). And, pre-empting these findings, the ‘folk theorem’, as game theorists call it, 
concluded that for indefinitely repeated games with little discounting of future payoffs 
cooperative equilibrium strategies will always exist (Binmore 2005). 
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So cooperation can result from self-regarding, broadly reciprocal, interactions between pairs 
of individuals (so called direct reciprocity). But understanding how relationships develop in 
small communities is not just a matter of summing all the dyadic relationships within it. 
Individuals learn about the cooperativeness of others by interacting with them, observing 
them directly and talking to third parties (Dunbar 2004). In this way they build up 
reputational knowledge invaluable when responding to offers of interaction with the potential 
for mutual benefit, or when selecting partners for such interactions themselves (Roberts 1998; 
Gurven 2004; Craik 2009). Alexander (1987) was the first evolutionary biologist to 
emphasise the importance of this process for the evolution of cooperation. He coined the term 
indirect reciprocity to describe the biasing of cooperative responses to those known to have 
been cooperative to others in the past and there is now experimental evidence that players are 
more likely to cooperate with other cooperators than with free-riders in small group 
interactions (e.g. Milinski et al. 2001; Barclay 2004).  
 
The analysis so far shows that self-regarding rationality is compatible with cooperation when 
individuals interact repeatedly with known partners. However, laboratory and real world 
experiments show that people are not fully selfishly rational since participants also cooperate 
in one-shot prisoners’ dilemma games about half the time, and contribute in one-shot public 
goods games, the multi-person equivalent of the prisoners’ dilemma in which the rational 
decision is to give nothing (Camerer 2003). Behaviour in another and much simpler game, 
the dictator game, is particularly instructive. In this game a dictator simply decides how to 
split an amount of money between themselves and another player. The rational self-regarding 
choice is clearly to give nothing away but giving 10-20% of the fund is common (Camerer 
2003). The results from this and other games played in many different societies, while 
showing much variation – understandable in terms of the economic and societal structure of 
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the culture – demonstrate that pure selfishness is rare and suggest the existence of what may 
be a universal sense of fairness (Henrich et al. 2004).  
 
Such a predisposition for fairness may have been favoured by selection, acting both 
genetically and culturally (Chudek and Henrich 2011), since it undermines self-regarding 
rationality and eases the path to the more rewarding cooperative CC (rather than DD) 
outcome in prisoners' dilemma-type repeated encounters, and makes it possible in one-shot 
encounters too. In a manner that is similar to Roberts’s (2005) notion of interdependence, one 
way of representing the fairness motive is by adding some proportion of the other player’s 
payoff to one’s own. If this proportion is great enough (e.g. >0.67 for the payoffs in Figure 1) 
the Nash equilibrium and ESS become CC even in the one-shot game.  
 
Binmore (2005, Chapter 9) argues that our sense of fairness evolved as a stable social 
mechanism for sharing resources in the non-hierarchical societies of the earliest hunter-
gatherer humans and that we carry this same sense today. If we extrapolate from our 
knowledge of present-day egalitarian hunter-gatherers our earliest human ancestors benefited 
from sharing with their neighbours because of their interdependence (Roberts 2005) – 
particularly in cooperative hunting and gathering, and food sharing – and consequently had a 
stake in each other’s well-being. In particular, such cooperative practices reduce the risk of 
periods without food, and free riding on this system is not tolerated (Winterhalder 1986; 
Kaplan, Hill, and Hurtado 1990; Gurven 2004; Kelly 2013, Chapters 6, 7). (It is probably not 
a coincidence that the cooperative non-hierarchical structure, collective decision making, 
monitoring of resource acquisition by others, graded sanctions for defectors and conflict 
resolution mechanisms of many hunter-gatherer societies [Kelly 2013] are all features shared 
with successful common pool resource groups such as coastal fisheries and forestry systems 
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[Ostrom 1990].) An early human social contract characterized by sharing, as a form of 
enlightened self-interest, may be the origin of the Golden Rule – variations on ‘Do as you 
would be done by’ – probably the most universal ethical imperative that we have (Binmore 
2005, Chapter 9). 
 
While an early evolutionary origin for our widespread sense of fairness seems likely scholars 
differ on how best to explain the fact that we often act fairly in one-shot interactions in the 
real contemporary world (e.g. queueing or returning a lost wallet) and in the lab, when 
reciprocity is not expected. One explanation is that people think in such situations, 
consciously or not, as if they were repeated non-anonymous games, since the predisposition 
we bring to such encounters is one that evolved in the small groups of our early evolutionary 
history described above (e.g. Haselton and Nettle 2006). Gintis et al. (2003) disagree, arguing 
that early humans would also have engaged in encounters with a low probability of 
continuing, in which defection would have been the more profitable strategy. However, this 
doesn’t explain the cooperative responses that are regularly seen in one-off encounters in 
both the real world and the laboratory. A further point is that experimental one-shot 
interactions may be played like repeated games since they inadvertently share cues associated 
with the reputational indirect reciprocity consequences of being observed by others (Kurzban 
2001; Haley and Fessler 2005; Bateson, Nettle, and Roberts 2006). 
 
The behavioural expression of cooperation, or its absence, is inevitably accompanied by 
emotions including a feeling for the welfare of others, guilt, shame, a personal concern for 
reputation and a fear of punishment (Milinski et al. 2001; Fehr and Gachter 2002; Barclay 
2004; Bowles and Gintis 2011), and develops in the individual under the influence of social 
norms (e.g. Krupka and Weber 2013; Hugh-Jones and Ooi 2017). It is possible to incorporate 
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these processes into models that combine biological and cultural evolution, as discussed in 
the previous section, and such a model, simulating internalization of norms transmitted 
vertically between generations and obliquely by socialization institutions, concludes that 
cooperation can be maintained when a minority of the population exhibit strong reciprocity, 
cooperating unconditionally and punishing defectors at a personal cost (Gintis 2003). 
Although the importance of strong reciprocity for the evolution of cooperation is currently a 
matter of controversy (Guala 2012) the model exemplifies an approach to the problem of 
understanding how individuals and communities reach equilibrium prosocial states. This must 
occur by some combination of genetic evolution, cultural influence and direct experience but 
we are some way from a full understanding of the processes involved, and their interaction.  
 
Some discussion of altruism is also necessary here since, although formally distinguished 
from cooperation, the two prosocial acts share the consequence of benefitting others, 
differing in that the actor also benefits from a cooperative act but suffers a cost from an 
altruistic act. It is important to note that focusing narrowly on a single act defined, as above, 
as altruistic, may miss a bigger picture. The single act may be just one of a series of 
reciprocal altruistic exchanges, so that considered over a longer time period the relationship is 
seen to be one of cooperation, as in reciprocal food sharing, since both parties benefit. Here 
the success of cooperation relies on trusting that the other party will reciprocate. In the 
dictator game described above the single decision involved is ‘purely’ altruistic if anything is 
given to the other party, as it commonly is. Acts of cooperation and altruism, in addition to 
their direct consequences, may accrue delayed benefits due to direct and indirect reciprocity 
and may be selected for as honest signals of the ability to act in this way in the future 
(Roberts 1998).  
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However, a difference between cooperation and altruism important for us here is that acts of 
pure altruism favoured by selection in the small societies of our early history, due to delayed 
benefits, may not be personally beneficial in the large anonymous societies of the 
contemporary world, even though they continue to be selected by gene-culture coevolution 
due to internalization of norms built on evolved predispositions. The upshot of this, as I will 
go on to explain, is that I deal here with the influence of adversity on cooperation only and 
not on pure altruism as just described. This is partly because I am concerned with the more 
straightforward case where costs and benefits are borne in a given individual (the cooperative 
actor) in a given environment in the here and now. In pure altruism immediate benefit is 
borne only by another party who may inhabit a different (social) environment from the 
altruistic actor, such as the case of Christians who rescued Jews in Nazi-occupied Poland 
(Tec 1986) and those who rescued persecuted family members, friends and strangers in 
Argentina during the military rule of 1976–1983 (Casiro 2006). Any delayed benefits to the 
self of altruism through direct or indirect reciprocity, if there are any at all, take place in a 
future environment of an uncertain nature. In addition, even if one wanted to assume that our 
altruistic tendencies are built on the evolved predispositions mentioned above it would be 
very difficult to quantify the contribution of supposed delayed benefits to our altruistic 
decision making. For all these reasons altruism is not amenable to the analysis I describe in 
section 5. My analysis is suitable for examining cooperation, however, for which I need to 
consider only direct costs and benefits to the self and not to others (although even here the 
analysis is not perfect since cooperation may also have delayed benefits for the self).  
 
This account of the origins of human cooperation just scratches the surface of half a century 
of research on the topic (Ridley 1997; Hammerstein 2003; Gintis et al. 2005; Tomasello 
2009; Bowles and Gintis 2011). My aim here has been to outline the kinds of thinking 
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required for an understanding of the origin and maintenance of human cooperation as a 
prelude to the following discussion of the influence of adversity on cooperative behaviour.  
 
Finally, we should not exaggerate the human tendency to cooperate; like all human traits it is 
variable and some individuals, in some situations, prefer to free-ride on the generosity of 
others. 
 
4. Adversity and cooperation: Data 
What follows is by no means an exhaustive or systematic review but I have not been 
selective. I report all my findings from the literature on the influence of adversity on 
cooperation. 
 
Non-human cases 
There is a widespread tendency in the natural world for organisms to be more cooperative in 
conditions of adversity and I have not located any evidence to the contrary. The phenomenon 
has been reviewed by Andras and Lazarus (2005) and many of the following examples are 
taken from that account. 
 
•   In response to environmental stressors individual bacteria become social and form 
multi-cellular structures such as biofilms and mushroom bodies (Greenberg 2003) 
which enhance their resistance to the stressor, such as an antibiotic (Drenkard and 
Ausubel 2002). 
 
•   Social, in contrast to solitary, feeding in the nematode Caenorhabditis elegans is 
triggered by environmental stressors (de Bono et al. 2002). 
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•   Fish school and primate group sizes are larger where predation risk is greater (Seghers 
1974; Farr 1975; Hill and Lee 1998). Gregariousness reduces predation risk in various 
ways (Krause and Ruxton 2002). 
 
•   Colonies of the common mole-rat (Cryptomys hottentotus hottentotus) are larger in 
arid areas, which present greater foraging adversity, than in mesic (moderately moist) 
areas. Movement between colonies is also less frequent in arid areas. Larger and more 
stable colonies favour resource sharing and the development of cooperative 
relationships with known individuals (Spinks et al. 2000). 
 
•   The phenomenon is also found in plant communities, in which an individual plant, 
acting respectively competitively or cooperatively, can inhibit or promote the 
biomass, growth and reproduction of its neighbours. In 11 mountain habitats around 
the world relationships between neighbours in subalpine plant communities are more 
competitive whereas in the corresponding alpine communities, where abiotic stress is 
higher, cooperative interactions predominate (Callaway et al. 2002). 
 
The human case 
For the human case I have sought data from a range of methodologies: real life case studies 
and experiments; anthropological work; within- and between-society comparisons; self-report 
measures; and lab experiments. For reasons that will become clear in section 5 I divide the 
data into those in which, like the non-human data, cooperation increases with adversity, 
followed by those in which the opposite is the case. 
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Cooperation increases with adversity 
While there is a long-standing view in the social sciences that external threats increase group 
cohesion (Stein 1976) this is not always measured in behavioural terms. However, it seems to 
be commonplace that people caught up in a natural disaster cooperate in ways they would not 
consider under more normal circumstances. Members of the Committee on Disaster Studies 
of the National Academy of Sciences, USA write that following a natural disaster: 
The net result . . . is a dramatic increase in social solidarity among the affected 
populace . . . The sharing of a common threat to survival and the common 
suffering produced by the disaster tend to produce a breakdown of pre-existing 
social distinctions and a great outpouring of love, generosity, and altruism . . . 
persons tend to act toward one another spontaneously, sympathetically, and 
sentimentally, on the basis of common human needs rather than in terms of 
predisaster differences in social and economic status (Fritz and Williams 1957, 
48, emphasis added).  
This account provides something of a control condition in making a comparison with pre-
disaster behaviour.  
 
In the trench warfare of World War I cooperation between British and German infantry was 
commonplace. Between battles a ‘live and let live’ reciprocal arrangement developed 
whereby both sides refrained from firing on the enemy, in spite of the wishes of their 
commanders. This peaceful arrangement could be signaled, for example, by repeated daily 
firing at precisely the same position at precisely the same time. Axelrod (1984, drawing on 
Ashworth 1980) analyses this as an iterated prisoners’ dilemma in which, for the infantrymen 
at least, mutual cooperation was the best outcome. 
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These real world case studies show that some people behave cooperatively under severe 
adversity, sometimes at great personal cost, but they do not allow a quantitative comparison 
with the frequency or degree of cooperative behaviour in less adverse conditions. To provide 
the kind of data we are seeking here systematic studies are required. 
 
The set of studies probably closest to these real world cases of external threat are the 
experiments, carried out mostly in the lab (e.g. Puurtinen and Mappes 2009; Puurtinen, Heap, 
and Mappes 2015), but also in the real world (Erev, Bornstein, and Galili 1993) in which 
participants in small groups are found to cooperate more (generally through donations in a 
public goods game) when competing with other groups. The adversity in these studies is 
inferred to arise from the competition; it is intrinsic to the task and not a preexisting condition 
that participants bring to the experiment, as in the studies that follow. While this is an 
important distinction, for present purposes it needs to be examined in relation to my analysis 
in the following section, which is framed in terms of the individual’s perception of their 
adversity. A temporary adverse stimulus that arises immediately before a decision has to be 
made may have different consequences from that of a long-term adverse condition that one 
brings to an experiment, such as might arise from low social status or hunger, say. However, 
there are many psychological studies in which brief priming stimuli are remarkably effective 
in imitating the influence of long-term conditions, including those of prosociality (Piff et al. 
2010; Piff 2014; Nettle et al. 2014). Since brief exposure to competition in an experiment 
may also have such a priming effect it seems worthwhile to consider competition experiments 
as potentially suitable for our analysis here. 
 
Moving on to an anthropological study, in examining the influence of adversity using a 
random half of the societies in the standard cross-cultural sample Low (1990) found a 
	   23	  
significant positive association between extreme cold and the hunting of large game, which is 
a cooperative enterprise.  
 
Finally, in a US study of social class effects, with class measured by educational attainment 
and income, lower class participants offered more points than upper class participants in a 
trust game, a cooperative game involving trust that the partner will reciprocate (Piff et al. 
2010). 
 
Cooperation decreases with adversity  
The  results of the following two studies conflict with those of Piff et al. (2010) just described 
and I will return in the following section to the issue of how these results might be resolved. 
 
In his study of Tyneside neighbourhoods Nettle (2015; Nettle, Colléony, and Cockerill 2011, 
Schroeder, Pepper, and Nettle 2014) has compared ‘the informal social relationships and 
interactions that make up so much of everyday life’ (Nettle 2015, 12) of two neighbourhoods 
in the city of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK. These neighbourhoods, with populations of about 
3000 each, are markedly different in adversity as measured by the Index of Multiple 
Deprivation. The more deprived neighbourhood is at the 1st percentile of deprivation in 
England while the less deprived is at the 79th percentile, and the study was carried out at ‘a 
moment when people in [the former] neighbourhood had endured many years of uncertainty 
about the future of the whole area’ (12). A number of behavioural and self-report measures 
were made but the only ones relevant here were two self-report measures; adult respondents 
in the less deprived neighbourhood trusted each other more (in two studies) and felt more 
strongly that people in their neighbourhood looked out for one another. The finding on trust 
was replicated for children between 9 and 15 years of age across a range of neighbourhoods 
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differing in the level of deprivation. (Trust is not the same as cooperation but it is required if 
cooperation through repeated altruistic exchanges is to be successful.)  
 
In support of these findings Haushofer (2013) found, in large data sets from the World Values 
Survey, that trust increased significantly with income within countries and with per capita 
GDP (at purchasing power parity) across countries.  
 
Finally, I come to the tail of the distribution of environmental harshness, where case studies 
are naturally rare and where experiments are not possible. I describe three cases of societies 
living in conditions of extreme adversity; societies in extremis.  
 
Burch (2006, 272, as described by Kelly 2013, 288n6) found that in Alaskan Iñupiaq 
Eskimos ‘in periods of widespread famine and hunger, the [cooperative] distribution system 
broke down, families hoarded food, and some tried to steal the stores of others or even to kill 
the owners’. 
 
In 1969 and 1970 Laughlin (1974, 1978) studied the So, a small society in Northern Uganda: 
‘The total So ecological/economic picture is grim. It is one of progressive deterioration of 
alternative resource bases to the point where a period of drought brings extreme and 
widespread hardship and starvation to the people of So.’ (1974, 380). 
 
Laughlin quantified ‘generalized’ reciprocal exchange in the So, ‘where the emphasis is upon 
the act of exchange and not upon immediate return or making a profit’ (1974, 381) and 
compared its expression in two study periods, ‘one of extreme hardship [and a second] in 
relationship to the first a time of plenty’ (385). He found more generalized reciprocity in the 
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period of plenty and, although the data are not analysed statistically, the increases compared 
to the period of extreme hardship are quite large: 48% for feeding guests (‘the major medium 
of generalized reciprocity’ [386]); 124% for food transfers and 38% for total (food + non-
food) transfers. Generalized reciprocity contrasts with ‘negative reciprocity’ (i.e. exchange 
for profit) as a means of resource acquisition and when one type of reciprocity declines it is 
generally compensated by an increase in the other. This reminds us that in the real world – in 
contrast to the lab – cooperation is just one means of getting on in the world and is therefore 
subject, indirectly, to a range of influences, some of which may also be responsive to 
adversity. Thus in the So, to compensate for the reduction in generalized reciprocity during 
hardship the cash value of negative reciprocity increased in that period by 454%. 
 
The So are related to the Ik, who live further North in the mountains of northern Uganda. 
When studied by Turnbull (1966, 119-136, 1967, [1972] 1974, 1978) from 1964 to 1966 it 
would seem that the Ik lived in even greater hardship than the So and their society certainly 
suffered from a greater absence of cooperativeness. The Ik’s former nomadic hunting cycle 
had been curtailed by the government and this, together with the frequent droughts, led to 
intermittent famine and eventually the ‘disintegration of Ik society’ (1978, 53), Turnbull’s 
period of fieldwork coming at ‘a critical moment in the process of social change’ (1978, 53), 
though five years after Turnbull’s study Joseph Towles, Turnbull’s collaborator, found the 
social system much the same (Turnbull 1975, 355). In Turnbull’s account cooperation was 
limited to house building, which required more than a single builder, and individuals passed 
their lives in relative isolation. Family and community bonds of care broke down completely, 
children were weaned at the age of three and then left to forage for themselves, and young 
and old were left to die if they could not find sufficient food. Although children foraged in 
	   26	  
gangs, these gangs served only as protection against predators (including adult Ik) and food 
was not shared. 
[A child] learned that cooperation was rarely beneficial – a temporary expediency 
at best – and that the unpredictability of circumstances that could make it 
worthwhile meant that there was no value in establishing permanent bonds with 
others on grounds of age, sex, or kinship. He learned that systematic sociality 
itself had no value (1978, 64). 
Turnbull concluded that, given the ‘extreme . . . circumstances’ ([1972] 1974, 111) ‘the sadly 
functional nature of the Ik non-social system . . . was the only way to survive’ (Turnbull 
1976, 6). 
 
Turnbull’s 1972 book on the Ik, The Mountain People, was critically received by some 
anthropologists, partly for its claimed lack of objectivity (Beidelman 1973; Barth 1974; 
Wilson et al. 1975; Knight 1976). Two of these eight commentators (Barth, and Geddes in 
Wilson et al.) pointed to inconsistencies in Turnbull’s report but none doubted his findings as 
I describe them above. Heine (1985), who studied the Ik for two months in 1983, critiqued 
many aspects of Turnbull’s ethnographic work but again did not dispute the above 
description of Ik society. The Ik continue to live in northern Uganda today. 
 
5. Understanding the influence of adversity on cooperation 
Game theory models have illustrated ways in which environmental adversity selects for 
cooperation (Andras, Lazarus, and Roberts 2007; Smaldino, Schank, and McElreath 2013). 
Here I ask more simply, and more generally, what might the shape of the relationship 
between adversity and the benefit of cooperation look like, and what does that shape allow us 
to infer about how cooperation will vary with adversity? These questions were addressed by 
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Andras and Lazarus (2005), with additional mathematical formalities, and I develop the ideas 
further here. My aim is to see to what extent these proposed relationships might explain the 
findings described in section 4. This seems to be a particularly worthwhile exercise given the 
broad range of contexts and taxonomic groups in which cooperation is enhanced by adversity, 
while the relationship is reversed in extremis. Although I will focus on the human case the 
conclusions apply to the non-human examples too. 
 
The simple framework to be described is not intended to deny the complexity of 
environments and of social life but rather to provide an explanation for one feature of that 
complexity, environmental adversity, while acknowledging that adversity might work on 
cooperation in additional ways too. Adversity is a ubiquitous variable influencing a wide 
variety of cooperative interaction types, and it will be achieving its effects alongside a cluster 
of other influences. My approach does not deny that there are individual differences in what 
people see as a life of well-being and how that life may be enhanced, or sometimes 
diminished, by cooperation. As a natural scientist, however, I proceed in the belief that our 
understanding of how and why people interact with their environment as they do can be 
advanced by utilizing various methods of behavioural data collection, as well as statistical 
methods for taking individual differences into account. Finally, I am aware that I have offered 
only a small sample of human cases and that the pattern of results that emerges does not 
unequivocally support my analysis. However, studies of these relationships are still in their 
infancy and a comprehensive understanding is still some way off. In that context the fit 
between the data and the ideas I present here seems to merit further testing. 
 
It might be thought immediately obvious why people seem to cooperate more in adversity; 
that is, to provide an ultimate, or functional, explanation. People in adversity have a greater 
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‘need’, it might be argued, and everything else being equal we would expect that need to be 
met. Or it might be stated or hypothesized, though without supporting theory or evidence, 
that cooperation will be greater in a poorer group (da Costa, de Melo, and Lopes 2014, 455) 
or that this relationship has an inverted-U shape (Laughlin and Brady 1978). But as cost-
benefit analyses such explanations are incomplete, as I will show. In addition, they may not 
explain the effect of adversity in extremis reported above, which is given an explanation in 
the present analysis. 
 
I start with two general assumptions. First, as already stated, that well-being (and, for non-
humans, fitness) declines with adversity or, in other words, that it increases with the quality 
of the environment. Second, where cooperation is observed I assume that on average, and 
including any delayed benefits, it brings greater well-being than its non-cooperation 
alternative (but not necessarily for all individuals on all occasions, since there will generally 
be a dynamic which includes some degree of free riding). This assumption follows from 
the game theory prediction of how self-interested individuals will behave when the marginal 
net benefit of cooperation over non-cooperation (call it B), exceeds the threshold value at 
which cooperation becomes the equilibrium outcome (this kind of analysis was introduced 
in section 3 in discussion of the prisoners' dilemma). It follows in turn that cooperation will 
be more likely to occur where B is greater since a greater value of B is more likely to exceed 
the threshold relevant to any particular case. And if B increases further, above the threshold 
value, cooperation is predicted to increase in order to take up this additional benefit, 
following the same self-interested logic that applied to the switch from non-cooperation 
to cooperation at the threshold. Such an increase in cooperation can occur by repetition of 
a cooperative act or by replacing it with a more beneficial alternative, the increase 
in cooperation being subject to the usual limitations as it comes into conflict with other 
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demands on the individual’s time and effort. I consider below the case of how, in 
fact, B is predicted to change in magnitude with environmental quality.   
 
Though it is important to think in terms of net marginal benefit in defining B, to take account 
of potential marginal costs involved in cooperation (i.e. costs involved in cooperating that are 
absent when not cooperating), in some cases there may be no marginal costs. For example: a 
hunter or gatherer working with others rather than alone, where the benefit is bringing back 
more resources per capita; a car sharing scheme where the parties involved get a ride every 
day for a share of the overall cost; or a sharing of knowledge or expertise where the gain per 
capita is enhanced when cooperating. 
 
I represent these two assumptions graphically by two increasing functions relating 
environmental quality (E) to well-being (W), one function for the well-being of a cooperating 
individual and another for non-cooperation, the former function exceeding the latter for all 
values of E, for the reasons just argued. The non-cooperation function does not represent a 
free rider’s well-being but well-being if cooperation does not occur at all. The ‘well-being of 
a cooperating individual’ function represents well-being having provided a given cooperative 
act (at or above the cooperative threshold), and if this act has a marginal cost over non-
cooperation, it is assumed to be independent of the quality of the environment.  
 
Next, I add three further assumptions: that the shape of the increasing relationship between 
environmental quality and well-being is sigmoid, both when individuals do not cooperate and 
when they do; and that these two sigmoid functions converge at both extremes (Figure 2). 
The basis for these assumptions is presented in the Appendix. The slope of a sigmoid curve at 
first increases and then decreases; it is first concave upwards (what I shall call the left 
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segment of the curve) and then concave downwards, also called diminishing returns (the right 
segment). The pair of sigmoid curves, representing cooperation and non-cooperation, stand 
for the two conditions as they occur within a particular society or other group under analysis; 
I am not claiming that there is a common scale across all data sets that might be used to test 
the predictions. And in testing the predictions it will be important to assure, as far as is 
feasible, that the groups being compared along the environmental quality axis are indeed 
comparable on all features except that of some measure(s) of environmental adversity. 
 The marginal net benefit of cooperating (B), compared to not cooperating, at a given 
value of environmental quality (E) is therefore the difference in well-being between the 
cooperation and non-cooperation functions. This is the net benefit of the act over and above 
the condition of non-cooperation; the benefit gained as a result of the cooperative interaction 
or enterprise less any marginal cost of the individual’s contribution (i.e. cost over and above 
cost for the case of non-cooperation). It can be readily seen from Figure 2 that as E increases 
B at first increases up to an inflection point, Ei, on the environmental quality axis and then 
declines; an inverted-U relationship. Although any marginal cost of cooperation has been 
assumed to be independent of environmental quality this may not hold if resources for 
cooperation are required in advance of a cooperative relationship being initiated. In this case 
those in a higher quality environment may find this initial investment more affordable, which 
would raise the benefit somewhat in those environments. 
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Figure 2
 
Figure 2. The black curves are illustrative examples of the proposed sigmoid 
relationship between fitness/well-being (W) and environmental quality (E) in conditions 
of cooperation and non-cooperation. The red curve shows benefit (B); that is, the 
difference in fitness/well-being between cooperation and non-cooperation. Ei indicates 
the inflection point of environmental quality, at which benefit ceases to increase with E 
and begins to decline as E increases further. The image is the property of the author. 
 
The marginal net benefit of cooperating (B), compared to not cooperating, at a given value of 
environmental quality (E) is therefore the difference in well-being between the cooperation 
and non-cooperation functions. This is the net benefit of the act over and above the condition 
of non-cooperation; the benefit gained as a result of the cooperative interaction or enterprise 
less any marginal cost of the individual’s contribution (i.e. cost over and above cost for the 
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case of non-cooperation). It can be readily seen from Figure 2 that as E increases B at first 
increases up to an inflection point, Ei, on the environmental quality axis and then declines; 
an inverted-U relationship. Although any marginal cost of cooperation has been assumed to 
be independent of environmental quality this may not hold if resources for cooperation are 
required in advance of a cooperative relationship being initiated. In this case those in a higher 
quality environment may find this initial investment more affordable, which would raise the 
benefit somewhat in those environments. 
 
Since we would expect the occurrence of cooperation to map directly onto its marginal net 
benefit, B, this pattern captures the essence of most of the data I have reviewed, if we assume 
that the in extremis cases lie to the left of Ei, which is very plausible, and all other cases lie to 
the right of Ei, which is less certain. That is, cooperation declines with adversity in extremis 
but otherwise the opposite is the case. The sigmoid curves could be drawn in many ways; 
here I have speculatively drawn them so that Ei sits towards the adverse end of the 
environmental quality continuum. This is not an a priori assumption that I wish to defend; I 
have done it simply to capture one post hoc interpretation of the data, which is that the 
reversal of the ‘adversity enhances cooperation’ effect is rare and that it mostly occurs in 
extreme adversity (or in the extreme of relative deprivation [Davis 1959; Wilkinson and 
Pickett (2009) 2010], if relative and not absolute deprivation is the influential variable). A 
consequence of this position for the inflection point is that as environmental quality worsens 
beyond Ei the cooperation curve must fall steeply to converge with that for non-cooperation, 
which means that the benefit of cooperation will also fall steeply. A consequence of this is 
that below Ei the benefit of cooperation is very sensitive to small changes in environmental 
quality and I will return to the implications of this. 
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The cases that do not immediately fit into this scheme are Nettle’s (2015) Tyneside 
neighbourhood study and Haushofer’s (2013) multi-national study, in both of which 
cooperation declines with adversity. This divergence in results cannot be resolved with any 
certainty but I offer some observations. First, the deprived neighbourhood in Nettle’s study 
might lie to the left of Ei, which would mean that it fitted into the present scheme. I do not 
mean to suggest that this community has a life as harsh as that of the So and the Ik. However, 
its state of relative deprivation – relative to its UK comparators – may be similar; it is in the 
1% of the most deprived neighbourhoods in England. In addition, residents of the 
neighbourhood may share, but to a lesser extent, the problem responsible for the breakdown 
of Ik society, that of hunger. A recent account of the relationship between hunger, 
socioeconomic position (SEP) and behaviour reports that, based on US studies, ‘a substantial 
fraction of people from [low-income] households experience an excess of hunger due to their 
SEP, at least some of the time [and] . . . within very affluent populations, individuals of lower 
SEP eat less satiating diets; do so on more irregular schedules; and a very sizable proportion . 
. . report experiences such as food insufficiency and food insecurity that imply an increased 
frequency of hunger’ (cited in Nettle 2017, 7). Note also that the area containing the deprived 
neighbourhood contained an emergency-assistance food bank (Nettle 2015, 19). Nettle’s 
(2015) own analysis of his results bears some similarities to the above arguments, including 
as it does the proposition that the more deprived neighbourhood is ‘closer to the edge’ (60) in 
the sense that the only way to avoid a crisis is to cross this edge in the hope of a happy 
outcome to a risky venture. And when it comes to a potential cooperative interaction: 
[i]f the people in your neighbourhood are . . . close to the edge, then it makes 
sense that even if you had a lot of interaction with them you might not feel that 
you had enough interaction to say you knew what they were going to do next (61, 
emphasis in the original). 
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Standing (2011, 20) has a similar conception of the precariat which, he suggests: 
lives with anxiety – chronic insecurity associated not only with teetering on the 
edge, knowing that one mistake or one piece of bad luck could tip the balance 
between modest dignity and being a bag lady, but also with a fear of losing what 
they possess even while feeling cheated by not having more. 
 
My second observation is that the average per capita GDP measure used for Haushofer’s 
(2013) between-country comparison may well be unsuitable for the present analysis since a 
particular average value may be accompanied by very different distributions of values within 
the nation, and consequently different values for adversity, depending on how adversity maps 
to per capita GDP from country to country. Third, it is informative to examine Nettle’s and 
Haushofer’s trust measures further. These are the only studies reviewed here that employ 
self-report rather than behavioural measures and, of course, a trusting attitude is relevant in 
the present context only to the degree that it predicts cooperative behavior. While Nettle’s 
measure concerned trust of others within the same neighbourhood, Haushofer’s question – 
“Do you trust people you meet for the very first time?” – was more generic. This ‘generic 
trust’ measure is more problematic as evidence here since it is unclear what the environment 
of any imagined cooperation in the mind of the respondent might be; the respondent’s own 
environment, that of an imagined trustee, or something else? (See Nettle [2015, 63] for 
parallel comments on social environment.) 
 
My suggestion that Nettle’s deprived neighbourhood might lie in the left segment of the 
sigmoid meets a general problem for an explanation that predicts an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between two variables. As a specific example of this general problem, for the 
Tyneside neighbourhoods case to fit my explanation the wealthier neighbourhood should not 
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lie so far to the right that it is the less cooperative of the two. More generally, with few data 
points it is difficult to support or refute an inverted U-shaped relationship with confidence. 
With just two data points, a finding of more cooperation under adversity, less cooperation, or 
no difference in cooperation, could all be accommodated in the inverted-U relationship 
between environmental quality and benefit by placing the data points, respectively, on the 
right arm of the U, the left arm, or one on each arm. However, as more data points become 
available over a wider range of environmental qualities it is increasingly possible to support 
or reject the proposed relationship.  
 
In this context it is important to stress that I am not suggesting that a particular pair of 
sigmoid curves describes all cases (where by ‘cases’ I mean studies that compare cooperation 
between two or more levels of adversity) since different cases will involve different 
populations and will rarely use the same metrics for adversity and cooperation. To the extent 
that my thesis is correct each case of the cooperation-adversity relationship will have its own 
pair of sigmoid curves, the particular shapes of which (and consequently of the benefit curve) 
are free to vary. Indeed many cases, as in all the examples described here, will cover too 
narrow a range of adversities (or will compare too few adversity levels) to reveal a sigmoid 
relationship and instead the relationship will be monotonic. In this monotonic case my 
account predicts concave upwards functions below Ei, but concave downwards functions 
above Ei, additional evidence being required to support a case for one or the other position on 
the environmental quality axis. Finally, although I argue that all cases cannot be placed 
quantitatively within a single two-dimensional adversity-cooperation space, I do want 
tentatively to propose, on the basis of the studies I have described here, that Figure 2 may 
represent a broad and qualitative truth about the adversity-cooperation relationship 
(cooperation being narrowly and behaviourally defined, as I have stressed). That is, that the 
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relationship is negative over much of the range of environmental quality but that in the 
poorest environments it is reversed and is steeper. 
  
To my knowledge there are no data sets showing an inverted-U relationship between 
adversity and cooperation but this may be because no study (and particularly no experimental 
study) has considered a broad enough range of adversities. Another strong prediction of my 
proposition that needs testing is that the benefit of cooperation has an inverted U-shaped 
relationship with environmental quality. 
 
Although environmental quality takes the role here of an independent variable this does not 
mean that it is fixed. A cooperative act might have a sufficiently beneficial outcome to move 
the actor further to the right along the environmental quality axis. Another point about 
environmental quality, particularly for the human case, is that the best environments may 
offer opportunities for individuals to find new ways to cooperate, ways that increase the 
benefit of cooperation and may also improve environmental quality. 
 
This analysis of response to adversity, in which the environmental state is assumed to be fully 
known, complements that of Haselton and Nettle (2006), based on signal detection theory, for 
cases in which judgments are made in conditions of incomplete information. 
 
Populations in extremis 
I have found no non-human examples where cooperation is reduced by adversity. Under the 
present proposals such an example would represent a population to the left of the inflection 
point and therefore in or close to extremis. This lack of data could therefore be explained by 
such populations having a high risk of dying out, migrating to a more suitable environment, 
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or becoming permanently asocial, unless they were fortunate enough to be saved by 
environmental change or – particularly for human cases – by an outside agency. The risk of 
extinction or migration would be particularly acute due to the steep decline in cooperative 
benefit to the left of Ei. Gintis (2003, 160, emphasis in the original) takes a similar view, and 
points to a cruel irony: 
In the primitive conditions under which human sociality evolved, when a group 
was threatened with extinction or dispersal, say through war, pestilence, or 
famine, cooperation was most needed for survival. But since the probability that 
the group will dissolve increases sharply under such conditions, cooperation 
based on future reciprocation cannot be maintained. Thus, precisely when the 
group is most in need of prosocial behavior, cooperation based on repeated 
interactions will collapse. 
 
Turnbull (1976, 6) held that, for the Ik, acting alone brought greater benefits than cooperating 
since, to repeat an earlier quote, ‘the sadly functional nature of the Ik non-social system . . . 
was the only way to survive’. In terms of the present formulation this would mean that the 
cooperation and non-cooperation curves crossed at the adverse extreme. 
 
It is also possible that acting alone may be more beneficial than cooperating under certain 
circumstances in the very best environments, the cooperation and non-cooperation curves 
again crossing (John Baker and Siobhán O’Sullivan, personal communications, January 8, 
2017). 
 
6. Other forms of prosociality  
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Cooperative behaviour shares motivational and emotional features, and evolutionary and 
cultural origins, with related prosocial behaviours, beliefs and attitudes, and the influence of 
adversity has been studied here too. At the level of individual differences those with more 
adverse life experience exhibit more empathy, compassion and generosity in charitable giving 
and aid to a stranger (Lim and DeSteno 2016; Lim 2017). The influence of social class on 
prosociality is controversial, with recent conflicting findings for a range of measures: 
utilitarianism, empathy, feelings of entitlement, narcissism, theft, lying, cheating, helpfulness, 
generosity, trust, trustworthiness, volunteering and charitable donation. Some studies find 
greater prosociality in higher classes (Korndörfer, Egloff, and Schmukle 2015) but others find 
the opposite class effect (Côté, House, and Willer 2015), to mention just two of the most 
recent reports. In understanding these apparently conflicting findings it will be helpful to 
develop more tailored predictions for each measure, as attempted here for cooperation. If the 
inverted-U relationship proposed here between environmental quality and cooperation should 
hold also for some of these other forms of prosociality this might resolve some of the 
(apparent) inconsistencies in the data, since conflicting studies could be situated on opposite 
sides of the environmental inflection point. As others have noted it is also important to take 
account of the methodology by which these results have been obtained, from behavioural 
observations and experiments to self-report, in both the lab and the real world, since they 
each have their own psychological influences. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
Putting aside the case of societies in extremis for the moment, I have argued that in a more 
adverse environment a greater benefit is to be gained by cooperating and consequently that 
cooperation will be more common in these circumstances. This view is supported by data 
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from a broad range of non-human species and for a range of human contexts. The possible 
exception for the human case is the influence of socioeconomic position, where recent data 
show an unresolved picture. 
 
The major premise for my conclusions is that fitness or well-being is a sigmoid function of 
environmental quality and I have suggested ways in which the implications of this premise 
for patterns of cooperation can be tested. 
 
One can be either despairing or encouraged by this view of life. From the despondent position 
matters have to get bad before we make the most of our collaborative potential, while others 
will argue that it’s just when life is troublesome that we are able to rise to the occasion by 
acting together. Putting aside such subjective responses the more objective conclusion is that 
cooperation seems to be scaled to adversity, and responds adaptively to need. 
 
In the very poorest environments, however, prosociality may break down altogether and a 
tentative conclusion from the arguments and evidence presented here is that quite small 
changes in adversity might have a large impact on cooperative sociality. Although this might 
work in either direction (Laughlin 1974, 1978) it requires theory on the dynamics of change 
to take this idea further. It is uncomfortable to accept, following Turnbull for the Ik, that 
individualism in extreme adversity is adaptive; that in extremis selfishness is the favoured 
choice for survival. He may be right, but outside such extreme conditions the unusual human 
capacity for cooperation is at the heart of our sociality.  
 
Acknowledgements 
	   40	  
I am extremely grateful to John Baker whose comments resulted in many improvements and 
clarifications, including discussion of the comparability of environments when testing the 
ideas presented here. My thanks also to Tony Bennett, Matthew Johnson and Siobhán 
O’Sullivan for information and discussion, and to Quoc Vuong for guidance in preparing 
figure 2. 
 
Appendix: Evidence for the function shapes in figure 2 
This appendix provides evidence for the relationships between environmental quality and 
fitness or well-being proposed in figure 2 in three parts: the right (diminishing returns) 
segment of the sigmoid curves; the left segment; and the convergence of the two curves 
(cooperation and non-cooperation) at both extremes. The evidence here is not selective but I 
have not attempted to find evidence for every kind of adversity. 
 
The diminishing returns assumption is made in many behavioural ecological models; for 
example, for the way in which benefit to an offspring increases with parental investment 
(Trivers, 1974); however, we are seeking empirical support here. Consider the common case 
of resource acquisition. In healthy animal populations in the wild (i.e. not in extremis) the rate 
of food intake generally increases with food density in a diminishing returns fashion (e.g. 
Goss-Custard et al. 2006) in accordance with foraging theory, as a consequence of the 
limiting effect of the time it takes to handle food (Stephens and Krebs 1986, 15). In addition, 
as an animal becomes satiated, further food intake brings increasingly less benefit no matter 
how much food the environment holds (as Winterhalder, Lu, and Tucker [1999, 304] also 
argue). This is why hungry and thirsty pigeons in the lab switch frequently between eating 
and drinking rather than, say, feeding to satiation before they start drinking (McFarland and 
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Lloyd, 1973); a unit reduction in thirst or hunger increases fitness more when the animal is 
further from its optimal internal state. 
 
For humans, there is evidence of a diminishing marginal utility response of life expectancy to 
economic variables. This pattern is found across about 140 nations for the measure of 
national income per person (Wilkinson and Pickett [2009] 2010, Chapter 1; but see the main 
text discussion of Haushofer’s [2013] per capita GDP measure) and within a single country, 
the US, for lifetime earnings (Cristia 2009). In the UK, life expectancy shows diminishing 
returns to various measures of deprivation, sometimes with a small concave upwards trend 
for those least deprived (Buck and Maguire 2015). Further, many studies show that subjective 
well-being, measured as life satisfaction or happiness, has a positive and diminishing 
marginal utility response to income, income change or wealth, for analyses both between-
countries, developed and developing (Frey and Stutzer 2002; Howell and Howell 2008), and 
within countries (Cummins 2000 [a review of many studies]; Graham and Pettinato 2001; 
Møller and Saris 2001 [calculated from Tables I and II]; Frey and Stutzer 2002). The causal 
relationship is from income to subjective well-being rather than in the opposite direction 
(Frey and Stutzer 2002; Gere and Schimmack 2017).  
 
In a pioneering study of risk-sensitive foraging the feeding decisions of juncos are described 
by a sigmoid function. Experimental birds that would suffer a negative energy budget (‘in 
extremis’ conditions) if they fed at a predictable source are risk prone and show a concave 
upwards utility function, whereas those with a positive energy budget (i.e. a high 
environmental quality) are risk averse and have a diminishing returns utility function 
(Caraco, Martindale, and Whittam 1980). These results have now been replicated many times 
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in a variety of animal taxa, including two anthropological cases (reviewed by Winterhalder, 
Lu, and Tucker 1999). 
 
A sigmoid function has also been found significantly to explain the relationship between an 
individual’s quality and their resulting utility, outperforming linear and concave models, for 
primate sexual success as a function of rank, and for social rank (which predicts reproductive 
success) as a function of hunting yield in Aché hunters (Kuznar 2002). The proximate 
mechanisms responsible for these relationships is unknown and, although the sigmoid 
function is offered by Kuznar as an expression of differential risk sensitivity the mechanisms 
discussed earlier in this appendix may alternatively, or additionally, be responsible. In other 
anthropological studies risk sensitive decision making fits the predicted sigmoid pattern 
(Kuznar and Frederick 2003 ). 
 
A sigmoid function is also suggested by the nature of abiotic factors influencing fitness (or 
well-being, for the rest of this paragraph), such as temperature, humidity and a great many 
factors for human populations. For such features (pollutants and suchlike aside), and for a 
particular species, there is an optimum value that maximises an individual’s fitness, with 
fitness declining above and below this optimal value; an inverted-U shape. Now, unless the 
transition through the optimal value is to make a sharp discontinuity, which is biologically 
implausible, it follows that the function approaches the optimal value, from both sides, in a 
diminishing returns fashion. Imagine now the environmental quality axis reconceptualized so 
that fitness reaches a maximum value at the extreme right, representing the optimal value of, 
say, temperature for the species. In this reconceptualization each point to the left of this 
optimal value represents a pair of temperatures – one below the optimum and another above 
it – that have an equal effect on fitness. The axis therefore represents adversity whether due 
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to under- or over-shooting of the optimal environmental value and the redrawn function of 
temperature against adversity will be diminishing returns to the right. If the original inverted-
U function is roughly normally distributed, and therefore bell-shaped, the adverse extremes, 
on the far left of the reconceptualized axis, will be concave upwards and the whole function 
will then be sigmoid. Son and Lewis (2005) provide a corroborating example relating 
temperature to survival for three life history stages of an insect. The functions are bell-shaped 
to the right (high temperature), where survival was extremely low or zero (in extremis 
conditions). 
 
The data on severe food and water deprivation in rats (i.e. in extremis conditions, in contrast 
to natural feeding and drinking schedules [Siegel and Stuckey 1947]) show, as in the left 
segment of the sigmoid curve, a concave upwards relationship between environmental quality 
(the inverse of deprivation time) and fitness (the inverse of food or water intake after 
deprivation, a measure of distance from a homeostatic optimal state) (calculated from Clark 
[1958] and Stellar and Hill [1952] for food and water respectively). Andras and Lazarus 
(2005) assumed that the two curves might be convex upwards (diminishing returns) for the 
whole range of environmental quality but these data show this to be implausible. 
 
Finally, I argue that the two sigmoid curves are unlikely to be parallel (in which case the 
benefit of cooperation would be a constant for all values of the environment) but are likely to 
converge at both extremes. For an individual in an extremely high quality environment it 
seems likely that additional resources gained through cooperation would add little or nothing 
to fitness or well-being, either through sharing or by reciprocal altruistic exchanges. 
However, this may be too simplistic for the human case and I will consider it further in the 
text. 
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In the poorest environments, approaching in extremis conditions, there are several contexts in 
which convergence is likely. First, if cooperation consists of the acquisition and sharing of 
resources, at some point there are simply too few resources for cooperation – by physical 
help, skill and knowledge sharing, social influence or other means – to increase the resource 
sufficiently to compensate for the fact that it must be shared. Second, where cooperation 
consists of a series of altruistic exchanges the strength of short-term need is sufficiently 
strong that failing to reciprocate becomes the favoured response. Third, in a life with many 
pressing needs the opportunity to cooperate may be compromised by time constraints 
(Siobhán O’Sullivan, personal communication, January 8, 2017).  
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